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NOTES
SEPARATE TRIAL OF A CLAIM OR ISSUE IN MODERN
PLEADING: RULE 42(b) OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
One of the most striking attributes of modem pleading is its new
approach to the problems of joinder. Under the codes joinder was
regarded as a pleading problem, and limited categories of actions
in which joinder was proper were established in advance.' The
effect of these categories was to limite joinder arbitrarily,2 and even
where seemingly logical joinder requirement was developed it
could not properly meet all the situations which might arise in
practice.3 To avoid this rigidity which often resulted in a needless
multiplicity of trials, the new rules treat joinder not as a pleading
problem, but as one of trial convenience.4 The modem rules are
extraordinarily liberal, allowing joinder of practically any claim or
*The term "Rule 42(b)" as used in the text of this Note includes by
reference all the state equivalents to Federal Rule 42(b). See note 9 infra.
1. See 3 Moore, Federal Practice 1805 (2d ed. 1948).
2. Id. at 1806.
3. See Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 580-581 (1952).
4. Ibid.
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party5 with the ultimate goal of a "... just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action."8 While this aim is often achieved
by the settlement of as many matters as possible at a single trial, it
may be that certain combinations of issues or claims will lead instead
to confusion and injustice. The safeguard against such a possibility
is Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
"Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party claims, or issues."
It is clear from the text of the rule that the grant of discretionary
power to the judge is extremely broad, thereby providing a maxi-
mum of flexibility in adopting the rules of modem joinder to each
case as it is tried.7 It follows that the manner in which courts apply
Rule 42(b) is important to the successful operation of modern
pleading, federal and state." Excessive denial of separate trials will
result in some unfairness. On the other hand, excessive granting of
separate trials can to a large extent nullify the liberal joinder pro-
visions. This Note attempts to explore and analyze the court deci-
sions made under Rule 42(b) and its state equivalents 9 in the light
of the rule's purpose of supplying flexibility to modem pleading.
GRANTING OF SEPERATE TRIALS IN GENERAL
The first question which arises in a study of the application of
Rule 42(b) concerns the frequency with which separate trials are
granted or denied. A complete and accurate count is impossible for
two reasons. First, there is no way of telling in many instances
whether a separate trial has been granted because the case is not
reported. Second, even in the reported cases it is often difficult to
determine exactly what is being done, because the courts talk of
5. See Wright, supra note 3, at 581.
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
7. See Wright, mspra note 3, at 581.
8. The states regarded in this Note as having adopted modern pleading
insofar as joinder provisions are concerned are the following: Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.
9. Following are the state equivalents of Rule 42(b) : Ariz. Code Ann.§ 21-920 (1939) ; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 5, Rule 42(b) (1953) ; Del. Ch. R. 42(b),
Del. Super. Ct R. 42(b) ; Iowa R. Civ. P. 186; Ky. R. Civ. P. 42.02; Minn.
R. Civ. P. 42.02; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.180 (1949); Nev. R. Civ. P. 42(b);
N. J. Civ. Prac. R. 4:43-2; N M. S. A. § 21-1-1 (42) (b) (1953); Tex. R.
Civ. P. 174(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 3-1710
(1945). New York allows order of separate trials under N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act§§ 193-a(4), 212(3), 258, 262, 443.
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"separate trial" and "severance" interchangeably.' 0 Nevertheless,
some meaningful statistics can be compiled by including those
severances which seem tantamount to separate trials under Rule
42(b).11
The following is a very limited breakdown of the cases found
on the subject in the federal and state courts .12
Separate Trials Separate Trials
Granted or Conducted Denied
Federal .............. 62 28
State:
Rule 42(b) clearly ... 40 10
"Severances"........ 19 8
State Totals ...... 59 18
Federal and State:
Sum Totals ....... 121 46
It is, of course, dangerous to draw conclusions from these figures
without further examining the cases, but it is clear that the courts
have not been slow to exercise their discretion in ordering separate
trials. Whether the granting of separate trials in nearly three-fourths
of the cases represents an excess in one direction or another can
only be decided after a case by case analysis.
SEPARATE TRIAL OF CLAIMS
The first natural division of cases arising under Rule 42(b)
concerns the setting aside of whole claims for separate trial. A
claim is usually tried separately for one of three reasons: to avoid
confusing the jury or court; to conform to the requirements of
precedural necessity or convenience; or to prevent prejudice to a
party. While these reasons are not mutually exclusive, they may
.be considered separately.
Separate Trial of Claims to Avoid Confision
The first reason for ordering a separate trial is that the case
is simply too complicated as it stands. An example is found in a case
where the claim was for copyright infringement and the counter-
10. Properly speaking, severance of a claim leaves it as an entirely
independent action to be tried, while separate trials will usually result in but
one judgment. Wright, Minnesota Rules, Rule 21, Comment 2 (1954).
11. Those severances which are included are the ones apparently grant-
ed for the same reasons that a separate trial is ordered under Rule 42(b)-
the furtherance of convenience or avoiding of prejudice. Not included are
severances granted in the few situations where there has been improperjoinder.
12. Further statistics broken down by claims and issues will be found
in the appendix to this Note.
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claim was for damages under the antitrust laws. The court ordered
separate trial of the counterclaim 3 to make possible a more con-
venient disposition of the case. Clearly, the two claims involved
were of an unusually complex nature. Indeed, an antitrust action
is such a complicated affair that it is not surprising to find separate
trials ordered, for one reason or another, in six of the seven cases
found where antitrust counterclaims were asserted.14 Patent litiga-
tion is another complex area where separate trials are frequently
used. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 5 the plain-
tiff brought an action for declaratory judgment of the invalidity, on
grounds of misuse, of some 10,1300 patents operated in a pool by the
defendants over a period of thirty years. The defendant counter-
claimed for infringement of 40 specific patents. The court suggested
that the defendant move for a separate trial of his counterclaim,
saying that ". . .a trial of both issues would impose a heavier burden
than one has the right to ask of any single judge."16 In actions like
these, it is clear that a single trial of all claims would be a tremen-
dous task for either judge or jury.
Another instance in which separate trials have been ordered
occurs when two claims are asserted which are utterly different in
both fact and law. There confusion of the jurors may result from
their trying to keep in mind the two divergent and unrelated claims.
Thus a claim of one party in libel can be separated from the com-
bined claims of the other party for patent infringement, breach
of confidential relations, and trade mark infringement."
Needless to say, the dictates of common sense must control in
these cases. Where two claims, such as one for copyright infringe-
ment and another for unfair competition, are for practical purposes
distinct even though related in subject, they can be tried sepa-
rately.' As Judge Clark points out, "Here the evidence to support
13. See Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v.
WCAU Broadcasting Co., 35 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
14. Separate trial ordered: Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Alexander's Dep't
Stores, Inc., 11 F. R. D. 405 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories v. International Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 899(E.D. N.Y. 1951) ; Forstmann Wo>len Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F. R. D.
367 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; Container Co. v. Carpenter Container Corp., 9 F. R. D.
89 (D. Del. 1949); Hartford-Empiire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 F. R. D.
50 (W.D. Pa. 1943) ; Society of European Stage Authors and Composers v.
WCAU Broadcasting Co., 35 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1940). Separate trial
denied: Reliable Machine Works, Inc. v. Furtrex Machine Corp. of America,
11 F. R. D. 525 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
15. 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952).
16. Id. at 576.
17. Martin v. Wyeth, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md.), aff'd, 193 F. 2d
58 (4th Cir. 1951).
18. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir.
1939).
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the first claim would to a considerable extent be different from, and
in addition to, that for the second claim, and there would be little,
if any, gain in forcing them always to be tried and adjudicated to-
gether."' 0 When this requirement of separate proof is not met,
there is no justification for separating claims merely because they
are distinguishable. Consequently, a claim for patent infingement
and a counterclaim under another patent should not be separated
when the subjects of both patents are quite similar.2 0 A separate
trial of one claim has even been denied on the ground that a jury
would be confused if restricted to one issue when evidence concern-
ing the other claims would have to be admitted.2 1 Certainly the
denial of separate trial in these situations is only sensible. Only
when virtually no duplication will result should a separate trial
be granted merely because the claims are dissimilar, or the purpose
of modern pleading to provide inexpensive trials will be defeated. It
should also be kept in mind that one trial is generally cheaper than
two,22 even when the claims require wholly different proof. The
presumption should be in favor of a single trial.
Another situation in which separate trials are requested under
Rule 42(b) occurs when a threat of confusion arises, not from the
total dissimilarity of claims, but from their very similarity. The
cases found in this category thus far are confined to actions where
a plaintiff sues an employer under the Federal Employers Liability
Act or a shipowner under the Jones Act. A third party is sued
jointly or impleaded as a defendant on a theory of common law
negligence. The result is that the party being sued under the statute
does not have the defenses of contributory negligence or assumption
of risk.2 3 Contributory negligence can only be offered in mitiga-
tion of damages.24 In contrast, both these defenses are available to
the third party. The third party then moves for a separate trial on
the ground that the two theories of liability would confuse the jury
to his prejudice. Despite the plausibility of the argument, third
parties have been unsuccessful in convincing the courts of the
19. Id. at 87 (concurring opinion).
20. Frostidrink, Inc. v. Supervend Corp., 89 F. Supp. 550 (N.D. Tex.
1950).
21. Suffin v. Springer, 1 F. R. D. 245 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
22. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1211 (2d ed. 1951).
23. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C § 53 (1952) ; 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as
amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 54 (1952) ; 38 Stat. 1185 (1915),
as amended, 41 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1952) ; The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U. S. 110 (1936) (assumption of risk not a defense in Jones Act
case even prior to 1939 amendment of Federal Employers Liability Act, 53
Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (1952)).
24. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1952) ; 38 Stat 1185 (1915),
as amended, 41 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1952).
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desirability of a separate trial in four of the five cases found on the
subject.2 5 In two of the cases requiring a single trial the courts
find that no formidable difficulty results from the two different
theories of liability.26 In fact, however, it would appear entirely
possible that the jury could become confused to the prejudice of
the third party. Ordinarily this threat of unfairness might well
justify a separate trial even though there would be duplication of
such matters as the issue of foreseeability; fairness is certainly a
consideration paramount to convenience. But the best reason given
for not allowing a separate trial in these cases is that it might
prejudice the plaintiff.27 Each jury in the separate trials could
come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was injured by the negli-
gence of the defendant who was not then on trial. In that event, the
plaintiff would be without remedy even though both juries found
he had been injured by the negiligence of another. While it is true
that each defendant would have been found not negligent, that could
be attributed to the advantage each one had in being able to assert
the negligence of the other party who was not present to deny it.
There is no doubt that a real possibility exits that the jury in a joint
trial would have found one or the other of the defendants liable.
All possible inconsistent results are avoided by denying the
separate trial.
The final major source of confusion arises from the third-party
practice allowed by the new rules. The introduction of third parties
and claims concerning them may well lead to situations confusing
to a jury. Thus the personal infury claim of a wife against a defend-
ant who brings in the husband as a third-party defendant may be
separated from the claims of the husband arising from the same
accident.28 Third-party complaints against the defendant's surety
have been ordered tried separately to avoid undue delay of the
plaintiff's claim,2 9 or to prevent complication of the main
25. "Severance" was granted in Ginsburg v. Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey, 5 F. R. D. 48 (S.D. N.Y. 1945). "Severance" or separate trial was
denied in: Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry., 98 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn. 1951),
aff'd, Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 201 F. 2d 408 (8th
Cir. 1953) ; Pabellon v. Grace Lines, Inc., 12 F. R. D. 123 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) ;
Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 5 F. R. D. 398 (S.D. N.Y.
1946). It was held error to grant a separate trial in Way v. Waterloo, Cedar
Falls & Northern R. R., 239 Iowa 244, 29 N. W. 2d 867 (1947).
26. Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry., 98 F. Supp. 746 (D. Minn. 1951);
Pabellon v. Grace Lines, Inc., 12 F. R. D. 123 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
27. Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 5 F. R. D. 398
(S.D. N.Y. 1946) ; Way v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern R. R., 239
Iowa 244, 29 N. W. 2d 867 (1947).
28. Chevassus v. Harley, 8 F. R. D. 410 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
29. Langdon & Matule, Inc. v. Eureka Iron Works, Inc., 85 N. Y. S. 2d
478 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd ment., 275 App. Div. 659, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1st
Dep't 1949).
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action.30 But trial of the surety claim with the main action will not
always result in delay,3' and a single trial may save both time and ex-
pense.3 2 A more convincing reason for separating the claim against a
surety is that it may be unnecessary to try that claim if the main ac-
tion is decided for the defendant. 33 In any case, the courts have made
it clear that multiple parties are to be expected under the new rules
and separate trials should not be granted merely because the liberal
joinder provisions are used. Thus a third-party claim need not be
tried separately simply because the issues may become compli-
cated, so long as they can be disposed of at one trial,3 4 nor where
ultimate liability cannot be fixed without determination of several
common fact issues.35 Several claims brought by one plaintiff
against different defendants can be tried together when there are
issues common to all. 86 A good illustration of the court's denying a
separate trial where most of the possible objections to multiple
parties were raised is Brewster v. Gair Realty Corp.3 7 The plaintiff
there raised, among others, the arguments that his claim would be
delayed, that his selection of jurors would be hampered by the
peremptory challenge right of the impleaded party, and that his
witnesses would be cross-examined by someone whom he is not
suing. The court denied the "severance," pointing out that these
complaints are no different from those possible in every case where
impleader is allowed.38 To this it might be added that, if a trial is to
be regarded partly as a device for getting at the truth, there is
really nothing lost by having one more party scrutinizing the jury
and cross-examining the witnesses. In any event, it appears that
the courts are not reacting unfavorably to the multiple party actions
arising under the new rules.
Generally, then, it may be said that to avoid confusion a separate
trial of a claim may be ordered where a single trial of all the claims
30. Bank of New York v. Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 195 Misc.
812, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 694, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (Sup. Ct 1948), aff'd inem., 275
App. Div. 932, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 701 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 301 N. Y. 503, 93
N. E. 2d 71 (1950).
31. Cf. Salzberg v. Raynay Holding Corp., 188 Misc. 1009, 69 N. Y. S.
2d 608 (N. Y. City Ct 1947).
32. See Fortune v. Syracuse, 191 Misc. 738, 744, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 775,
781 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
33. See United States v. Montlack, 11 F. R. D. 159, 160 (E.D. N.Y.
1951). In that case only the surety claim was a jury matter, so there was a
possibility of wholly avoiding a jury trial.
34. Avery v. Noack, 2d Dist. Minn., Feb. 5, 1953, partially extracted in
Wright, Minnesota Rules, Rule 42, Comment 2 (1954).
35. Van Orden v. Bartnett, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 1008 (Sup. Ct 1950).
36. Henry v. Goliger, 94 F. Supp. (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
37. 101 N. Y. S. 2d 1006 (Sup. Ct 1950).
38. Id. at 1007-1008.
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and parties will be intolerably complicated or will involve the
juxtaposition of theoretically divergent claims. Naturally, there is
no way of telling how many overly complicated trials have been
conducted where no motion was made for separate trial, but it
appears that separate trials have been awarded in extremely com-
plicated litigation when requested. Yet separate trials have not
generally been granted where duplication would result.
Separate Trial of Claims for Procedural Convenience
A claim may be set aside for separate trial when it will, in one
way or another, aid in the disposition of a case in a rather mechanical
sense. If one claim can be disposed of very easily and the other can-
not, separate trial is possible if the facts are not too closely con-
nected.3 9 Thus a summary judgment can be given on one or more
claims, and the remaining ones may be tried separately under
Rule 42 (b) .40 While the separation of a claim which can be decided
without trial is clearly a convenience to all parties, there is a danger
when multiple defendants are concerned that the early dismissal of
one defendant may prejudice the remaining ones.41 An example of
such prejudice occurred in a case where an injured passenger of
one car in a collision sued the drivers of both cars involved. At the
close of the plaintiff's case, the court erroneously directed a verdict
for one defendant against whom a submissable case had been made.
On appeal it was held that the other defendant could properly com-
plain of this error because it deprived him of his only defense-
the sole negligence of the first driver.42 Thus the separate trial is a
convenient instrument with which to dispose of claims summarily,
but it may be a dangerous one if its effect on all parties is not
thoroughly considered before it is used.
The joinder of legal and equitable claims in one action can lead
to separate trials, as the jury trial can be separately conducted under
Rule 42(b) .4 Thus antitrust counterclaims have been set aside
for separate jury trial, leaving for trial to the court the "equitable"
claim of unfair competition.4 -' In such cases, where the equitable
39. See Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. 2d 83, 87 (2d
Cir. 1939) (concurring opinion).
40. E.g., California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 68 F.
Supp. 499 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) ; Meilde v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 44 F. Supp.
460 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
41. See Bates v. Miller, 133 F. 2d 645, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 210 (1943).
42. Biggs v. Crosswhite, 240 Mo. App. 1171, 225 S. W. 2d 514 (1949).
43. See Keene v. Hale-Halsell Co., 118 F. 2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1940).
44. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. International Pharmaceutical
Labs., 98 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. N.Y. 1951) (unfair competition) ; Forstmann
Woolen Co. v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 11 F. R. D. 405 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) (unfair competition and trademark infringement).
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issue is quite complicated, it is certainly best to order a separate
trial instead of having the jury sit by while those claims are tried to
the court. But in other cases a simultaneous trial is convenient and
will avoid much duplication. The mere fact that one claim is legal
and the other equitable is not of itself reason enough to order
separate trials under Rule 42(b).45 In all, the courts do not appear
to have acted without good reasons on those occasions when sepa-
rate trials of legal and equitable claims were ordered. Rule 42(b)
is apparently being used effectively enough in the furtherance of
procedural convenience.
Separate Trial of Claims to Avoid Prejudice
One other class of cases in which separate trial of a claim is
ordered is that where the single trial, while not overly complicated
nor physically inconvenient, would for one reason or another preju-
dice one of the parties. Such a situation is frequently found when the
defendant impleads his insurer. In nearly all of the cases found on
the subject, the courts have held that the action against the insurer
should not be tried with the main action, on the ground that it
would prejudice the insurer to have the fact of insurance made
known at the main trial.46 Severance has been granted47 even
though the court admitted that a modem juror probably knows
that practically everyone carries automobile liability insurance.4 8
Needless to say, when prejudice to a party is involved, a separate
trial can be granted even though litigation of an issue might be
duplicated.49 Generally, it may be doubted that anything is gained
by keeping the fact of insurance from the jurors.5 0 If the jurors have
not assumed that the defendant is insured, it will almost certainly be
made clear to them on voir dire. Yet the cases show that the courts
for the most part are simply unwilling to take the step and allow
joint trial of an insurer.
Another type of prejudice which may occasion a separate
trial is the delay of plaintiff's claim. Hence, where the plaintiff's
45. Elkins v. Nobel, I F. R. D. 357 (E.D. N.Y. 1940).
46. E.g., Gleason v. Sailer, 203 Misc. 227, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct
1952) ; Taplin v. Stevens, 280 App. Div. 960, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 606 (4th Dep't
1952). See Luethi v. Stanko, 4th Dist. Minn., Jan. 27, 1953.
47. Remch v. Grabow, 193 Misc. 731, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 462 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (separate trial only if case is tried before a jury).
48. Id. at 733, 70 N. Y. S. 2d at 464.
49. Motor Trucking Co. v. De Gennaro Transp., Inc., 13 N. J. Super.
531, 80 A. 2d 660 (County Ct. 1951).
50. See DeParcq and Wright, Impleader of Defendant's Insurer Under
Modern Pleading Rules, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 229, 233-235 (1954) ; 36 Minn. L.
Rev. 421 (1952).
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claim was for re-employment under the Selective Service Act which
provides that such a claim shall be speedily heard, the court ordered
a separate trial of a counterclaim which might delay the action. 5'
Likewise, if an impleaded third party invoked the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Relief Act to delay trial until he was out of the service, a
plaintiff could obtain a separate trial of his main claim without
having to wait.52 The policy o these cases is simple: speed as well
as economy is a goal of the new rules. Here any gain from holding
only one trial would be more than offset by the failure to provide
the plaintiff with some approximation of speedy justice.
The last group of cases where separate trial of a claim may be
ordered to avoid prejudice to a party is particularly interesting.
Here the two claims are such that they have a combined effect quite
different from the sum of their separate effects. When two claims
being asserted are based on the negligence of one defendant in very
similar accidents happening within a short interval of time, the
cumulative effect may prejudice the jury against the defendant, and
a "severance" can be granted.53 It has also been held that a claim
on a contract could be separated from one for fraudulent shifting
of assets, on the ground that evidence as to the false transfer would
prejudice the defendants on the contract claim.54 This principle as it
is applied to claims could perhaps be extended to other cases where
one claim involves some act of doubtful morality on the part of the
defendant, wholly independent of the other claim. Finally, two per-
sonal injury cases should not be tried together when one of the
plaintiffs has injuries of a'gruesome nature, as the character of those
injuries might influence the ju:cors unconsciously to inflate the other
verdict.5" These cases show a recognition by the courts that a joint
trial of two claims is not neatly compartmentalized in the minds of
the jurors. All the evidence is together before them, and it cannot be
presumed that psychological factors attending one claim will be
without effect on the other. Yet these cases where prejudice might
carry over are unusual by their very circumstances. That the court
can order separate trials and thus meet the situation is a tribute to
the flexibility of Rule 42(b).
51. McCarthy v. M & M Transp. Co., 5 F. R. D. 290 (D. Mass. 1946).
52. See Miskell v. W. T. Cown, Inc., 10 F. R. D. 617, 618 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
53. McGowan v. 147 West 105th Street, Inc., 95 N. Y. S. 2d 94 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; accord, Stein v. Baff, 197 Misc. 509, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 298 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
54. Utilities Natural Gas Ccrp. v. Hill, 239 S. W. 2d 431 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951).
55. Baker v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 11 F. R. D. 440 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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Separate Trial of Claims Witlwut Apparent Reason
There is another class of cases which are difficult to explain,
not in the court's denial of the separate trial, but in the reasons for a
party making a motion for the separate trial in the first place. Per-
haps the motions are best explained either as delaying tactics or as
vestigial attempts to achieve the fragmentation existing before the
adoption of modem rules. A prime example is found where, after
a plaintiff was allowed to file a supplemental complaint to bring his
claim up to date, the defendant moved for a separate trial of the
matter contained in the supplemental complaint even though this
matter was virtually identical to that in the first complaint. The
court naturally refused,55 declaring that the whole purpose of the
supplemental complaint would be subverted by such a procedure.57
Likewise denied have been motions for separate trials concerning
one lease out of three on which an action was based, s one patent
out of four applying to the same piece of machinery, 59 and of the
claims of several plaintiffs damaged by a product of the defendant. 60
There would seem to be no benefit to be derived from separate trials
in any of these cases, so they were properly denied.
The Texas courts, on the other hand, take a unique approach to
the granting of separate trials under Rule 42(b). They have granted
severances or separate trials in over four-fifths of the cases found.
In an action by the seller for the purchase price of goods sold, the
Texas court severed the counterclaim for misrepresentation of
similar goods previously sold.01 A claim for fraudulent transfer of
community property has been separated from one for divorce when
there was no indication that prejudice or severe complication would
result, and the only convenience to the court would seem to be the
ease of hearing claims one at a time. 62 All of the Texas cases found
are on appeal, and it is natural that the lower court's granting of a
56. Conmar Products Corp. v. Lamar Slide Fasterner Corp., 50 F. Supp.
1019 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
57. Id. at 1020.
58. Barbee v. Buckner, 265 S. W. 2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
59. Western States Mach. Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., 37 F. Supp. 377
(E.D. N.Y. 1941).
60. Fiedler v. Farmers & Merchants Milling Co., 4th Dist. Minn., Oct.
31, 1952, partially extracted in Wright, Minnesota Rules, Rule 42, Comment
2 (1954).
61. See Waller Peanut Co. v. Lee County Peanut Co., 217 S. W. 2d
183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). This was a true severance which the appellate
court regarded as discretionary. It should be noted, however, that the Texas
counterclaim rule is not as liberal as the federal one. A tort cannot be the
subject of a counterclaim against a contractual demand, and vice versa,
"... unless it arises out of or is incident to or is connected with same." Tex.
R. Civ. P. 97(g).
62. Watson v. Watson, 270 S. W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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separate trial, being discretionary, will not be reversed unless some
very convincing reason be shown why it should. Yet the attitude
of the Texas courts can be gleaned from the reasons offered for
finding a "severance" or separate trial proper. Offered are the
justificati6ns that the issues were separate and distinct,63 that
severance made no difference to the adjudication of the main claim, 4
and that the party against whom the severed claim was asserted was
not insolvent. 5 There seems to be no presumption here in favor of a
single trial. As a result, the parties often must go through the extra
expenses attending two trials for little reason.
An unusual use of Rule 42(b) appears in the Texas case of
Leon v. Noble.66 There the defendant argued that the plaintiff was
estopped because his claim had been a compulsory counterclaim in a
prior suit by the defendant arising out of the same automobile acci-
dent. The plaintiff had taken a voluntary nonsuit on that counter-
claim becauge he had not been ready for trial. The court hearing the
later case held that the plaintiff was not estopped, because in allow-
ing the nonsuit the first court was merely exercising its discretion
in directing a separate trial. Such an application of Rule 42(b)
appears indefensible. It results in almost total duplication of evidence
in two trials. The first trial could have been postponed if the un-
readiness to try the counterclaim was excusable. The compulsory
counterclaim rule is totally emasculated if the counterclaim can be
tried separately or severed whenever a party requests it. Fortu-
nately, a later decision by another branch of the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals has gone quite the other way. 7 There it was held
that Rule 42(b) is not broad enough to allow "severance" of a
compulsory counterclaim, and both claim and counterclaim must
be tried at the same time. While it is probably a bit too rigid to say
that there can never be a separate trial of a compulsory counterclaim,
this case certainly takes the proper direction to avoid the harmful
results of Leon v. Noble. In any event, the marked tendency toward
allowing severance merely upon request seems to be confined to the
Texas courts.
It therefore appears that some separate trials of claims have been
ordered when the reasons for so doing have not been convincing or
have been totally absent. But it is clear that there have been many
63. See McGee v. McGee, 237 S. W. 2d 778, 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
64. See Trapp v. Atlantic Refining Co., 169 S. W. 2d 797, 800 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943).
65. See Waller Peanut Co. v. Lee County Peanut Co., 217 S. W. 2d 183,
185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
66. 234 S. W. 2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
67. See Ulmer v. Mackey, 242 S. W. 2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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more cases where good reasons have been given, where the separate
trial successfully prevented confusion or prejudice, or was pro-
cedurally convenient. On the whole it can be said that satisfactory
results are being achieved under Rule 42(b) for the separate trial of
claims.
SEPARATE TRIAL OF ISSUES
The courts grant separate trials of particular issues in even a
larger proportion of cases than they do of claims. Separate trials
have been granted or conducted in 60 cases found on the subject;
they have been denied in only 15. The granting of separate trial of
an issue is based, in nearly all of the cases, on the fact that a trial
of the one issue beforehand may be dispositive of the entire case. In
some instances there is added the possibility of prejudice to a party
if all the issues are tried together. An understanding of the manner
in which the separate trial of issues is being handled is best gained
by an examination of the cases where the question arises, either
as to the separation of small issues or large segments of the case.
Issue of Validity of a Release Executed by Plaintiff
One of the most common instances where the separate trial of an
issue is ordered occurs when the defendant offers in defense a re-
lease signed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff attacks its validity. A
separate trial is then granted to test the validity of the release. One
important reason given for the separate trial, and one which seldom
appears outside of release cases, is that it would prejudice the de-
fendant to have the issue tried with the rest of the claim. In some
instances where the release was obtained by the agent of an insur-
ance company, the courts have ordered a separate trial on the
ground that it would be prejudicial to have the existence of insur-
ance brought to the attention of the jury.68 The force of reason
probably lies more with one court which denied a separate trial of
the release issue8 8 with the statement that juries are not ". . . as
ingenuous as the law seems to suppose. ' 7 But, as was pointed out
earlier, courts by and large still refuse to let matters concerning
insurance come before the jury. The suggestion has also been made
that the defendant might be prejudiced, independently of the insur-
ance problem, by a single trial because the jury might minimize or
68. Larsen v. Powell, 16 F. R. D. 322 (D. Colo. 1954); see Bowie v.
Sorrell, 113 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F. 2d 49(4th Cir. 1953).
69. See Clark v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 3 F. R. D. 35 (E.D. N.Y.
1943).
70. Ibid.
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totally ignore the questions of negligence and damages.7' Conversely,
the argument has been accepted that a jury hearing both issues
might decide the release issue for the plaintiff because of the
jury's desire to hold the -defendant liable for his negligence.72- It
would seem that either occurrence is possible. A jury might want
to hold a grossly negligent defendant regardless of a release, and
might equally well want to hold a defendant who was guilty of
fraud whether or not he was negligent. It is preferable to separate
issues as well as claims when one of them involves moral turpitude
which does not causally affect the others.
Probably the soundest reason for trying the issue of release
separately, and the one most ofen advanced, is that it will dispose
of the entire case if the issue is decided for the defendant.7 3 Thus
the trial of the main issues, where most of the expense arises, could
be avoided. Likewise where the plaintiff has violated an agreement
not to bring an action in a state other than that in which he was
injured, the validity of this agreement should be determined first.7"
If the decision regarding the agreement's validity were postponed
until after a trial of the main issues, the purpose of the agreement
would have been frustrated even if it were found valid, and the
whole trial might become a nullity as well.
Because it is clearly sensible in many cases to try the validity
of the release first, it might be thought that a separate trial of that
issue had become automatic. It is gratifying to find that this is not so.
Where the release was obtained so close to the time of the injury
that the details of the injury would have to be introduced, as well as
the treatment which had bearing on the adequacy of the considera-
tion, a separate trial was denied.7 5 Furthermore, when the ground
of avoiding the release was mutual mistake as to the extent of the
injuries, a separate trial was denied because the issue was too in-
volved with the merits of the action.7 , In Fleischman v. Harwood7 7
a husband and wife sued for injuries to the wife alone. She had
signed a release and sought to avoid it. The defendant's motion for
separate trial of the release issue was denied because the husband's
71. See Nesbitt v. Hauck, 15 F. R. D. 254, 255-256 (D. S.D. 1954).
72. See Ross v. Service Lines, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 871, 871-872 (E.D. Ill.
1940).
73. This reason was the gro-nd for ordering separate trials in Sognose
Realties, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 15 F. R. D. 496 (S.D.
N.Y. 1954), and in Harkins v. Gilkey, 123 N. Y. S. 2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
74. Tague v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 5 F. R. D. 323 (E.D. N.Y.
1946).
75. Grissom v. Union Pacific R. R., 14 F. R. D. 263 (D. Colo. 1953).
76. Burton v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 108 N. Y. S. 2d 26 (Sup.
Ct. 1951).
77. 10 F. R. D. 139 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
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claim remained and there would have to be a trial on the merits
whether or not the release was valid. Thus the courts are not
granting separate trials of release issues when it would result in a
duplication of the evidence in two trials. In this area the courts are
exhibiting the flexibility required to achieve the goals of convenience
and economy.
Other Simple Issues Which May Dispose of the Case
There are a number of other issues for which separate trial is
often granted on the sole ground that a decision for the defendant
on one such issue will put an end to the litigation. For this reason
separate trials have been granted as to the particular defenses of the
statute of limitations,78 res judicata,7 9 estoppel by judgment, 0 and
the Statute of Frauds."' There would seemingly be no reason why
other similar defenses might not also be tried separately, although
a separate trial of laches has been denied when the motion was made
after the preparation for a single trial was virtually completed. 2
The only case found where a separate trial of the limitations issue
has been denied is Frasier v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.s s
In that action for damages under the antitrust laws, some of the
defendants sought a separate trial of the issue of limitations, not
as a bar to the action itself, but to restrict the trial and discovery
procedure to matters not cut off by the running of the statute.
The court refused to allow a trial of the limitations issue before com-
pletion of the discovery proceedings. The propriety of such a deci-
sion depends entirely on the facts of the particular case. A decision
that certain matters are barred by limitations would not preclude
discovery proceedings concerning those matters if they were in some
way relevant to the subject of the pending action.8 4 But such a de-
cision might well render much of the matter involved irrelevant,
and where this possibility exists the discovery procedure should be
postponed until it is determined how much of it will be necessary.8 '
78. Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 30
F. Supp. 671 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
79. See Reeves v. Jersey City, 16 N. J. Super. 231, 233-235, 84 A. 2d 42,
43-44 (County Ct. 1951) ; see Calva v. J. Laskin & Sons Corp., 279 App. Div.
907, 113 N. Y. Supp. 223, 223-224 (1st Dep't), aff'd iene., 304 N. Y. 770, 109
N. E. 2d 75 (1952).
80. Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 6 F. R. D. 222(D. Mass. 1946).
81. Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 3 F. R. D. 279 (D. Del. 1943).
82. Greenspon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 8 F. R. D. 485 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
83, 119 F. Supp. 495 (D. Neb. 1954).
84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
85. Cf. Mfomand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 6 F. R. D.
222 (D. Mass. 1946) (some issues possibly barred by way of estoppel).
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An early separate trial would seem quite desirable when there is a
possibility of avoiding some of the discovery proceedings, espe-
cially in complicated cases where they are likely to be very expensive
and inconvenient.
Another group of issues which may merit a separate trial under
Rule 42(b) concerns the jurisdiction of the court to hear a case. For
instance, separate trials have leen held on the issues of diversity of
citizenship 86 and the existence of a justiciable case or controversy8 7
in order to establish federal jurisdiction. These decisions are certainly
proper when the jurisdiction issue is a separate matter which may
result in the case being thrown out of court, but any generalization
covering the issue of jurisdiction would be unwise. In the case of
Cain v. Blumberg,88 the court denied a separate trial of the issue
whether the claim equalled the amount requisite for federal diversity
jurisdiction, because it would have involved a detailed inquiry into
the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, causing much duplication. It
would seem that in this case the only thing to be gained by a separate
trial would be a possible elimination of the need to try the liability
question, which appeared to be a slight one. Equally great would
have been the possibility thai: much of the evidence on damages
would have had to be heard twice. In such a situation there is no
reason for risking the event of two trials. This case indicates that the
issue of jurisdiction is no more fit for mechanical handling under
Rule 42(b) than is any other issue, and the courts are not so
handling it.
Another issue which appears to exist quite apart from the
merits of the case is that of the standing of a party to maintain an
action. This issue has frequently appeared where a party is attack-
ing the validity of a will and the question arises whether he is a
person interested in the estate. If all the contestants are being
challenged, the issue of their standing may be heard separately as
this would avoid a will contest if decided against the contestants. 0
Even if there are other, unchallenged contestants, the standing of
one may be determined separately when it will simplify for the
jury the issues in the will conest9 But separation under those cir-
cumstances is not ordered where the standing depends on whether
a prior will was effectively revoked by the execution of a later one,
86. See Glaspell v. Davis, 2 F. R. D. 301 (D. Ore. 1942).
87. Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp.
355 (S.D. N.Y. 1953) (separate trial ordered).
88. 51 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. La. 1943).
89. It re Gerdes' Estate, 62 N. W. 2d 777 (Iowa 1954).
90. In re Alexander's Estate, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 399 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
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when this would lead to the duplication of hearing evidence on such
issues as fraud, undue influence, and testamentary capacity. 91 This
possibility of duplication simply illustrates the proposition that some
thought is required before any issue is set aside for separate trial.
The seemingly independent issue of the standing of a party is often
a special part of the merits of a case.
There are many instances where, because of the special circum-
stances of a particular case, one point arises which might be dis-
positive of the whole controversy. Thus, in King v. Edward Hines
Lumber Co.,9 2 the parties agreed that there would be no case for
the plaintiff if the road on which an accident occurred was not a
public highway to which an Oregon traffic statute applied. The
court tried the issue separately under Rule 42(b) and found the
road not to be public, thereby ending the case with a minimum of ex-
pense and inconvenience. In an action under the Federal Employers
Liability Act the question whether the plaintiff employee was en-
gaged in interstate commerce has been tried first as it was a condi-
tion precedent to the action. 3 Likewise it can be determined in a
seperate trial whether a plaintiff was an employee of the defendant
and thereby barred by the compensation laws from suing on the basis
of negligence. 9 In all of these cases, a special issue comes to the fore
which may be dispositive of the case and which is easily isolated for
trial. Under such circumstances there can be little doubt about the
desirability of a separate trial. This does not mean that a separate
trial is in order whenever it is possible to see some element on
which the case might depend. For example, plaintiff cannot get
a separate trial of the defense asserted that his complaint fails to state
a claim, when such a hearing would merely carve the heart out of
a case and dispose of it beforehand for the convenience of the
plaintiff. 5 It is clear then, that the courts have been allowing sepa-
rate trials of particular issues which, as a general defense or a
special point of the case at hand, may be dispositive of the case and
are conveniently heard separately.
Division of Trial into Segments
There is another group of cases where the issue sought to be
separated is not a simple, easily heard one but is instead a very
91. In re Aims' Estate, 199 Misc. 185, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 140 (Surr. Ct.
1950).
92. 68 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Ore. 1946).
93. See Ermin v. Pennsylvania R. R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. N.Y. 1941).
94. Hernandez v. Light Pub. Co., 245 S. W. 2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
95. See Winkler v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 810,
812 (E.D. N.Y. 1940).
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important segment of the case. One reason for granting a separate
trial in such a situation may be that there is a possibility of avoiding
a part of the trial which would be especially inconvenient because
of unusual circumstances. Thus the issue of liability was tried before
that of damages in Rickenbcwher Transp., Inc. v'. Pennsylvania
R. R.,96 where the plaintiff's truck containing shipments from 35
consignors was hit by the defendant's train. The damages question
would have required detailed evidence from 35 sources. Clearly it is
much more practical first to determine whether the defendant is
liable before presenting evidence on such a complicated question.
Perhaps the best example of the saving of time and expense to be
gained from a separate trial of the liability question is provided by
In re Texas City Disaster Litigation.97 In that case a separate find-
ing that the United States was not liable on some 273 consolidated
suits obviated the necessity of hearing evidence of damages to 8485
plaintiffs suing on various death, personal injury, and property
damage claims.
Another area where liability is often tried before the issue of
damages is that of patent infringement. There the issues of patent
validity and infringement may be tried together before the issue
of damages as both the former issues must be decided for the plain-
tiff before damages become a question. 8 These cases can be ex-
plained by the fact that the liability issues are separable from that of
damages and the latter is extremely complex. Complexity of the
damages issue without separability is not enough, however. For ex-
ample, damages for violation of the antitrust acts are complex, but
a separate trial of that issue has been denied because there could
be no liability without damages.9 9 Nor can separate trial under
Rule 42(b) be granted in a situation where fraud in wrongfully
claiming second class postal rates would necessarily require dam-
ages to make it a fraud.100 The courts therefore have been con-
sistent in giving separate trials for the issue of liability where it can
be separated without making trial of the remaining damages issue
senseless or repetitious, and where trial of that remaining issue
will be complicated in itself. No cases have been found separating
liability from damages when all these factors are not present, but
96. 3 F. R. D. 202 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
97. 197 F. 2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd seb nora. Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953), 38 Minn. L. Rev. 175 (1954).
98. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 7 F. R. D. 362
(E.D. N.Y. 1947).
99. McClain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 10 F. R. D. 261 (S.D. Mo.
1950).
100. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 9
F. R. D. 179 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
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it has been suggested that the practice of trying liability separately
should be extended.1' 1 It is true that a decision for the defendant on
the issue of liability would end the case, and the issue could be
heard separately without duplicating the evidence as to damages.
But in many cases, especially personal injury negligence cases, the
separation might affect the outcome of the case. It can reasonably be
suspected that the degree of negligence, the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff, and other conduct of the parties are presently re-
flected, with many juries, in the finding of damages as well as the
finding of liability. To a purist it probably would seem desirable
to put an end to this, but it may be argued that this lends a beneficial
flexibility to the strict rules of liability and contributory negligence.
At least it should be recognized that separate trials of liability and
damages would differ from a single trial in more than form. It is one
thing for a jury to find a defendant liable when it can itself fix the
damages. It is another to do so when it is not known at the time
what the damages will be. It may well be better to allow the present
system to continue where, according to the community standard
represented by the jury, liability is a quantitative as well as qualita-
tive matter. In any event, the cases to date indicate that the separa-
tion of liability from damages is not being asked of the courts in the
ordinary run of cases.
Another major segment of a case capable of separate determina-
tion appears in contract actions. The court may order a separate
trial of the existence of a contract on which the action is based. °0 2
Similarly, in a complicated case calling in question the validity of
some 550 patents, the issue of existence of a licensing agreement
was ordered tried separately when such a contract would win the
case for the defendant by estoppel.10 3 The validity of a contract may
be a subject for separate trial, just as its existence can. A separate
consolidated trial has been ordered on the issue of insanity of a
person who was the defendant in two different contract actions. 0 4
In these situations where a decision on the contract issue might
avoid a complicated action, or two separate actions, a separate trial
is clearly preferable. In neither case will there be duplication of
evidence. Yet separate trials are not always advisable merely be-
cause the issues are separable and could dispose of the case. In
101. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice 1217 (2d ed. 1951).
102. J. C. Spach Wagon Works, Inc. v. Union Paste Co., 10 F. R. D.
204 (D. Mass. 1950) ; see Sterett v. Dyer, 230 S. W. 2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950).
103. Air King Products Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 10 F. R. D.
381 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
104. Hotel George V v. McLean, 1 F. R. D. 241 (D. D.C. 1940).
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Hammonds v. Hammonds0 5 the lower court, on motion of both
parties, tried separately in two different trials the issues of undue
influence and testamentary capacity in a will contest. Though either
issue would have settled the case if decided for the contestants, the
separate trials *drew the following comment from the appellate
court: "We are at a loss to understand on what theory or ground a
trial court should permit, even by consent of all parties, separate
trials in a will contest on the issues of undue influence and mental
capacity. The purpose of [Rule 42(b)] is to reduce rather than in-
crease the number of trials."'10 1 This case serves to illustrate two im-
portant points. First, the separate trial of issues dispositive of the
case can be carried so far that it defeats its own purpose. Second,
the separate trial under Rule 42(b) is a matter in which the con-
venience of the court, not that of the parties, is the dominant con-
sideration.1 07 In view of the fact that most court calendars are filled
for some time in advance, the efficient disposition of cases is im-
portant to others than just the parties involved in each suit.
As for the separation of issues in general, it can be seen that
separate trial under Rule 42(b) has been granted in a considerable
number of cases. When the issue may be dispositive of the case, is
easily separable, and leaves substantial or complex issues remaining
to be tried, separate trials have often been granted and have worked to
the advantage of all concerned.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing text as well as the appendix indicates that the
courts are exercising their discretion in ordering separate trials
under Rule 42(b) both as to claims and issues. While there are cases
in which the separate trial resulted in duplication, delay, or un-
necessary expense, these havt been relatively few, concentrated
mostly in the state cases concerning claims. The cases where sepa-
rate trials are granted may be divided into the groups discussed in
this Note. In each group there are enough exceptions to indicate
that the advisability of a separate trial is a matter to be determined
according to the circumstances of each case. Consequently no
formula can be evolved which will serve as a grand summary of
all the material found concerning Rule 42(b). What can be said
is that on the whole the separate trial has proved a very flexible and
105. 263 S. W. 2d 348 (Mo. 1954).
106. Id. at 350.
107. See Wright, Minnesota Rules, Rule 42, Comment 2 (1954).
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useful instrument for preventing confusion, avoiding prejudice, and
providing a convenient method of disposing of litigation as fairly
and quickly as possible. The rule serves its purpose in modern
pleading.
APPENDIX 0 s
Separate Trials Separate Trials
Granted or Conducted Denied
Claims ................. 61 31
Separate trials ..... 37 17
"Severances" .. ..... 24 14
Antitrust claims ...... 6 1
FELA, Jones Act and
negligence ......... 1 4
Summary judgment. etc. 11 0
Legal and equitable .... 9 1
Impleader insurer ..... 9 1
Similar claims ....... 1 0
Issues .................. 60 15
Validity of releases .... 15 4
Limitations, laches .... 6 2
Res judicata, estoppel.. 5 1
Statute of Frauds ..... 2 0
Status of will contestant 3 2
Liability and damages.. 2 2
Patent: liability and
damages ........... 4 0
108. The breakdown into specific claims or issues here is obviously not
complete. Only the recurring claims or issues lend themselves to classification
for statistical purposes.
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